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TAB D

ESTIMATE OF THE PRESENT STRENGTH AND  
CAPABILITIES OF ANTI-COMMUNIST GUER-  
RILLAS IN CHINA

A. THEIR STRENGTH AND LOCATION

1. The maximum total number of effective guerrillas throughout all China which can with any certainty be said to exist at the present time is approximately 175,000. Dormant or potential guerrillas exist in unknown numbers, but the utility of this category is and probably will remain small pending all-out war or revolution in China.

2. Active guerrilla forces are located for the most part in inaccessible areas -- mountainous regions and on Nationalist-held offshore islands. Principal regions of activity continue to be the Pearl River and Canton area, the Kwangtung-Fukien border, the Kwangsi-Kweichow border, Szechwan, the Chekiang coast, southwestern Yunnan, and scattered areas in the Mongol and Moslem northwest.

B. THEIR PHYSICAL COMPOSITION AND CONDITION

3. The term "guerrillas" is an elastic one since these resistance forces are heterogeneous in nature and vary greatly in composition from one unit to another. Generally speaking, guerrillas fall into the following categories: (a) ex-Nationalist forces, some of whom profess allegiance, but most of whom owe no allegiance, to Taiwan; (b) discontented

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landlords and peasants; (c) bandits; (d) members of traditional secret societies, and (e) minority racial and religious groups. The most active and effective units are those in categories (a) and (e).

4. Guerrilla forces suffer from a total lack of central direction and coordination, from a relative lack of organization, quite often from lack of knowledge of proper guerrilla warfare tactics, from serious deficiencies in arms and ammunition, and, perhaps most importantly, from an almost total lack of communication facilities. In addition, guerrilla forces subsist on submarginal food, clothing, and medical levels.

C. THEIR MOTIVATION AND ALLEGIANCE

5. Economic considerations generally outweigh political, and the basic motivating force behind guerrilla activity at the present time is the struggle for existence and self-preservation.

6. Despite Nationalist and independent claims, the Chinese guerrillas are and will be allegiant for the most part to whatever leader and whatever political group can support and maintain them.

7. Such organization and centralized direction as does exist is primarily that now being exercised by Taiwan. The Chinese Nationalist guerrilla effort, however, remains largely ineffectual because of the hindrances of internal Chinese Nationalist politics.

8. Independent elements continue to claim a substantial guerrilla potential in Kwangsi and Kwangtung. It is believed that the claims of

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Taiwan against an all-out assault by the Chinese Communist Forces. After the Nationalist Ground Forces become effective (possibly during 1953 under the present US aid program), the Nationalists might be able to establish a bridgehead on the China coast, provided that the US furnished substantial air and naval support in addition to logistic support for the Nationalist invasion forces. If the US program for the Chinese Nationalists were greatly expanded so as to improve Nationalists military leadership and provide the materiel and training needed for existing ground, naval, and air forces plus such additional manpower as could be recruited on Taiwan, the Nationalists might be able to establish a bridgehead on the China coast without further US participation. However, we do not believe that such a bridgehead could be consolidated and expanded, unless the US provided tactical air support in addition to continuing logistic support for the Nationalist forces. Even under these circumstances, it is doubtful if the Nationalists could recruit sufficient additional manpower on the mainland to enable them to break out of a lodgement and actually threaten Communist control over large areas of the mainland. In the light of estimated current Chinese Communist capabilities, the Nationalists could accomplish this result only in conjunction with a major US war effort, including at least a US strategic bombing campaign and probably the support of US ground forces.

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